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Abstract 
 Prominent roles for general attention resources are posited in many models of working 
memory, but the manner in which these can be allocated differs between models or is not 
sufficiently specified. We varied the payoffs for correct responses in two temporally-overlapping 
recognition tasks, a visual array comparison task and a tone sequence comparison task. In the 
critical conditions, an increase in reward for one task corresponded to a decrease in reward for 
the concurrent task, but memory load remained constant. Our results show patterns of 
interference consistent with a trade-off between the tasks, suggesting that a shared resource can 
be flexibly divided, rather than only fully allotted to either of the tasks. Our findings support a 
role for a domain-general resource in models of working memory, and furthermore suggest that 
this resource is flexibly divisible. 
 
Word count: 136 
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Flexible attention allocation to visual and auditory working memory tasks: 
Manipulating reward induces a trade-off 
 
Working memory is a complex system that holds information while it is temporarily 
available to be processed further and manipulated (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2007; 
Cowan, 1988, 2005; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Miyake & Shah, 1999). A key issue is 
whether information in working memory is held entirely in separate modules that do not affect 
one another (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999), or whether it is held at least partly 
in a common faculty in which information from various sources share limited resources (e.g., 
Baddeley, 2001; Cowan, 2001, 2005). In order to determine which view is correct, one must 
explore the nature of interference between concurrent working memory loads imposed in 
different domains, such as the visual-spatial and acoustic-verbal domains. 
Such interference is often observed, but there are still controversies concerning the nature of 
that interference. One issue has been whether cross-domain interference can be obtained at all.  
At least some experiments have shown such interference (Morey & Cowan, 2004, 2005; Saults 
& Cowan, 2007; Stevanovski & Jolicoeur, 2007; Vergauwe, Barrouillet, & Camos, 2010), 
though others have shown little or no such interference (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972; 
Cocchini, Logie, Della Sala, MacPherson, & Baddeley, 2002; Logie, Zucco, & Baddeley, 1990).  
We will reexamine this issue in a manner complementary to previous studies. 
A second issue is whether the individual can choose the proportions of working memory 
resources to allocate to the two tasks, or whether that proportion is immutable. If attention is 
involved in working memory storage and maintenance, the allocation of that resource should be 
at least partly voluntary. That is true regardless of the particular model of working memory. If 
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one accepts a modular conception of working memory (e.g., Baddeley, 1986), attention 
governing the central executive could regulate how many stimuli held in each domain-specific 
buffer are rehearsed or refreshed; at least the initiation of a rehearsal cycle seems to require some 
attention (Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1984). If one accepts a less modular conception of 
working memory (e.g., Cowan, 1988, 2005), attention might determine how many stimuli from 
each domain are represented in a common, central store.   
In contrast to both of these approaches, though, some varieties of a modular approach seem 
to exclude a role of domain-general attention (e.g., Cocchini et al., 2002; Wickens, 1984, 2002). 
According to such approaches, the amount of interference between working memory tasks might 
depend solely on the amount of overlap between the stimuli to be remembered in the two tasks; 
the primary source of interference is the competition between similar stimuli for access to their 
appropriate storage module. First, we aim to confirm that some cross-domain interference indeed 
occurs, using motivational incentives as an operationalization of volitional attention. Second, 
assuming some degree of interference is observed, we shall have new information to restrict the 
plausible features of any shared resource, whether that resource is considered a process manager 
(like the central executive) or a shared store (like the focus of attention or episodic buffer). 
Currently, the descriptions of these resources are so vague that it is not necessarily clear how 
they might be shared between two competing tasks. Is a general working memory resource 
shared only in the sense that auditory-verbal or visual-spatial tasks may each use it, but without 
sharing it concurrently? Alternatively, perhaps a shared resource may be arbitrarily divided and 
deployed to assist in the maintenance of two kinds of memoranda. If so, how fine can this 
division be? The results we report provide new limitations to be applied to existing models of 
domain-general resources in working memory. 
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The Present Study 
 Theoretically, there are at least two methods to examine cross-domain interference between 
two working memory tasks. In the first method, the difficulty of at least one of the tasks is 
manipulated and evidence for an effect on performance of the other task is examined. This is the 
method used by all of the dual-task studies noted above, and has certainly proved a fruitful 
strategy for research. Here, we instead use a second method for examining dual-task 
performance that is well-regarded but not often used: to manipulate the relative payoffs or 
attention allocation instructions of the two tasks instead of task difficulty (Gopher & Donchin, 
1986; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Sperling & Dosher, 1986; for more recent applications see 
Alvarez, Horowitz, Arsenio, DiMase, & Wolfe, 2005; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & 
Anderson, 1996). The logic of these two approaches is similar; as either the difficulty of, or 
incentive to, one task increases, performance on the other task should decrease if a shared 
resource is needed to carry out both tasks at once. In the trade-offs approach, if a common 
attentional resource is needed in both tasks, then emphasizing one task should result in an 
improvement in that task at the expense of performance on the other task.  
Evidence from difficulty manipulations has been mixed, with some researchers observing 
cross-domain dual-task costs but many observing few or no costs. However, the pattern of 
performance observed in dual-task studies manipulating difficulty can be difficult to interpret 
clearly. Where cross-domain dual tasks costs have been observed, increasing difficulty of Task A 
in one domain results in decreased performance on both Task A and concurrent Task B in some 
other domain. In these cases, the cost to Task B must reflect some cross-domain resource 
sharing, but the cost to Task A might reflect either domain-specific resource limitations, domain-
general limitations, or some combination of these. Expected trade-offs in a scenario in which 
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reward is manipulated instead of difficulty are more straightforward in some respects. First, 
because the paradigm encourages selective resource-sharing, one expects performance on one 
task to improve at the expense of the other, rather than performance on both to decrease. Second, 
any change to either task with changing reward level must be attributed to whatever resource 
they share. The extent to which trade-offs are observed under this circumstance might reflect the 
extent to which individuals can determine which task to prioritize, or to selectively attend. 
Manipulating payoffs is therefore a method whose success depends on the availability of a 
reasonable estimate of storage capacity. Such estimates have been advocated by Pashler (1988), 
as well as Cowan (2001) and Cowan, Elliott, Saults, Morey, Mattox, and Hismatjullina (2005), 
and variations of this estimate have been used successfully in a profusion of studies of working 
memory based on the visual comparison procedure of Phillips (1974), reintroduced by Luck and 
Vogel (1997; e.g., Alvarez & Cavanaugh, 2004; Gold, Wilk, McMahon, Buchanan, & Luck, 
2003; Rouder, Morey, Cowan, Zwilling, Morey, & Pratte, 2008; Todd & Marois, 2004, 2005; Xu 
& Chun, 2006; also with a sequential visual memory task, Kumar & Jiang, 2005). One benefit of 
a capacity metric is that it leads to a clear expectation for the form of a trade-off function, 
whereas in many situations this function must be determined empirically (Alvarez et al., 2005). 
With a capacity measure for each task, the trade-off should be linear if the shared resource has a 
constant capacity; when the payoffs change, an increase in X units in capacity for Task 1 should 
always produce a decrease in C*X units for capacity in Task 2. This expectation follows from the 
simple physical metaphor in which a maintaining an item takes up a certain proportion of the 
shared resources.   
In certain circumstances, though, C≠1.  This is the case if the units differ between tasks or 
the tasks differ in the amount of domain-specific mnemonic capacity. Importantly, in our design, 
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estimates of storage capacity are meant as dependent variables, calculated to provide comparable 
measures between two different tasks, and it need not be assumed that C=1. Certainly, a trade-off 
between tasks, which in this case would manifest itself as a reduction in capacity estimates of the 
less rewarded task and a corresponding increase in capacity estimates of the more rewarded task, 
could arise due to dependence on any kind of shared general resource, whether that resource is 
thought to function as a memory store (e.g. Baddeley’s episodic buffer, 2001; Cowan’s focus of 
attention, 2005) or as mnemonic processing (e.g., Baddeley’s central executive, 1986). In either 
case, estimates of storage capacity would change with the proportion of reward given for each 
task, albeit for different reasons. Observing any trade-off would further confirm sharing of some 
domain-general resource, as in the working memory models of Baddeley and Cowan, in 
opposition to the notion that mental resources are predominantly separate on several dimensions 
(Wickens, 2002). Furthermore, the characteristics of any observed trade-off might improve the 
specificity with which a domain-general resource can be described, which is essential for making 
further progress in understanding any relationship between attention and memory. 
We used a manipulation of financial payoffs in three dual-task working memory 
experiments. In different conditions of each experiment, different allocation instructions were 
used while the number of memoranda in each task was held constant. The concurrent tasks, tone 
sequence comparison and visual array comparison, were the same across all conditions within 
each experiment, and challenging levels of difficulty were chosen so that the tasks were unlikely 
to be accomplished using only automatically-activated memory buffers. In designing these tasks, 
we endeavored to create two tasks that were as equivalent as possible except with respect to the 
stimulus domain of the memoranda, so that capacity could be estimated in the same manner for 
both tasks. The critical difference between conditions in each experiment was the level of reward 
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assigned to correct responses in each task. In most conditions, the total potential reward was 
fixed, and what distinguished the conditions was how the reward was divided between the two 
tasks. An exception was two conditions in Experiment 2 that were included to ensure that 
attention allocation, rather than total effort expended, explained performance differences 
between conditions. 
By using multiple payoff conditions we can also determine how fine-grained the attention 
allocation process can be. For example, it might be that participants have only two possible 
attentional states: attend to a task or ignore it. Alternatively, participants might be able to split 
attention between the two tasks. If participants can allocate some proportion of attention to both 
tasks, how flexible can this allocation be?  Note that this flexibility might occur in terms of either 
the splitting of attention on an individual trial, or in terms of some proportion of trials with 
attention to each task; we cannot distinguish between those possibilities, as indeed no other prior 
study has been able to do. 
We report three similar experiments, all contributing to a comprehensive Bayesian analysis. 
In these studies, we included various combinations of reward levels but, overall, we wanted to 
assess whether reward levels affect performance and if so, how flexible this effect might be. 
Using traditional inference techniques, this question might be addressed with ANOVAs, in 
which we test for any effect of the reward variable, and subsequent post-hoc tests, by which we 
test (assuming a main effect of the reward variable) how finely a shared resource may be divided 
by comparing each level of reward. A simple main effect of the reward variable would indicate 
that some shared resource can be split between the concurrent tasks. Differences between precise 
levels of reward in the expected direction (i.e., no reward < low reward < high reward < full 
reward), could be taken as evidence that fine, rather than all-or-none allocation of this resource, 
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is possible. However, an enormous sample might be required to detect significant differences 
between each level of reward, and moreover, a flexible division of resources does not depend on 
observing significant mean differences between each reward level. Rather, the joint orderings of 
reward level conditions in each task might be evaluated. With a Bayesian analysis, the question 
of interest can be addressed more powerfully and more directly.  Specifically, we constructed a 
nested series of comparisons of theoretically possible joint orderings, supposing different levels 
of divisibility in a shared attention resource. For each comparison, we calculated a Bayes factor, 
and compared these Bayes factors to evaluate the evidence for each theoretical level of divisible 
attention. Because we observed similar effects of reward across all three experiments, it is best to 
combine the results of all three of our studies into one comprehensive analysis, which is possible 
and advantageous when using hierarchical estimation techniques. We therefore present the 
method for all experiments together so that, in turn, we can consider the results of all 
experiments together. 
General Method 
Because we wanted to compare cross-modal performance on comparable visual-spatial and 
auditory tasks, we combined a tone-sequence comparison task (as in Cowan et al., 2005) with a 
visual array comparison task (cf. Luck & Vogel, 1997; Phillips, 1974).  Both tasks were two-
alternative forced-choice recognition tasks. In both tasks, stimuli were selected randomly on each 
trial from comparably-sized samples. The tone stimuli might not be continuously rehearsed with 
the passive phonological loop as a verbal list might be, which is important inasmuch as we aimed 
to measure dual-task interference in a central resource. To further ensure that such rehearsal was 
not effective for either type of stimulus, participants engaged in articulatory suppression by 
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repeating the word “the” throughout each of the three experiments, a standard precaution taken 
in many visual change detection experiments. 
 In our procedure, a sample visual array and a sample tone sequence were presented one after 
another, in either order. Then a test array and a test tone sequence were presented, with a 
response required for each task. Participants indicated whether the two arrays were identical or 
differed in the color of one square and whether the two tone sequences were identical or differed 
in the pitch of one tone. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 1, for one of the two orders of the 
stimuli that were used. The order of presentation of the sets of stimuli to be remembered always 
matched the order of the tests.  
- - - - - Figure 1 about here - - - - - 
 In order to make the visual array and tone sequence recognition tasks as equivalent as 
possible, we re-presented an entire array and sequence at test. The task was to indicate whether 
one item had changed. This whole-array procedure is commonly employed (cf. Cowan et al., 
2005; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Saults & Cowan, 2007; Vogel, McCollough, & Mackizawa, 2005) 
although it is also common to employ probes with only one item present or with only one item 
marked as possibly having changed (for a comparison of whole- and partial-report tests see 
Wheeler & Treisman, 2002). We chose to use whole-report probes to allow us to probe memory 
for the assignment of items to spatial or temporal positions; this was necessary because probing 
the simple presence versus absence of a single item leads to poor results for tone sequences, 
which rely on relational information. We therefore used the whole-report method for both tasks, 
to ensure that the tasks were as similar as possible except for the stimulus domain of the 
memoranda. For this variation of change detection task, Pashler’s (1988) capacity estimate is the 
appropriate metric, because it was constructed for the procedure in which the entire array is 
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reproduced at test with a possible change in one item, whereas Cowan’s (2001) estimate was 
constructed for a single-item probe procedure. Both estimates combine hits and false alarms in a 
principled manner. The difference in assumptions between Pashler’s estimate and Cowan’s is 
reflected after dropping redundant terms by dividing Cowan’s estimate by the correct rejection 
rate. 
Experiment 1 
Participants   
Participants, recruited from the University of Missouri introductory psychology pool, 
received partial course credit for taking part in the study and a monetary reward of up to $10 for 
correct responses. Participants earned an average of $8.24 (range: $6.61-$9.87). Three were 
excluded due to chance accuracy in at least one condition for each task and three others were 
excluded due to computer failure errors, leaving a final N=32 (17 men, 15 women). Each was 
randomly assigned to one of the two stimulus orders shown in Figure 1. 
Apparatus and stimuli  
 The experiment was controlled with E-Prime (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
We chose to use arrays of 8 squares and sequences of 6 tones in an effort to equate task 
accuracies on the basis of pilot results. Visual stimuli were displayed on a 17-inch (43.18 cm) 
monitor set to a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. Each visual array included eight 20 x 20 pixel 
squares scattered at randomly chosen locations at least 2° apart within a 270 x 201 pixel area in 
the center of the screen. The centermost point was excluded as a possible location. Assuming a 
viewing distance of 50 cm, each square occupied approximately 2° of visual angle. Each square 
color was selected randomly with replacement from a set of seven easily discriminable colors 
including red, blue, green, yellow, black, white, and violet, which appeared against a neutral grey 
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background. The first array (sample) and the second array (test) were either identical or differed 
in the color of only one square. Tone stimuli were presented via headphones at approximately 78 
dB. Each tone sequence contained six tones played at a rate of four per second. Tones were 
drawn randomly without replacement from a set of nine pitches (87, 174, 266, 348, 529, 696, 
788, 880, and 972 Hz). On trials in which one tone changed, the change could be to a pitch that 
was new to the sequence or a repeat of a tone that occurred at another position in the sequence. 
Since these pitches did not comprise a typical Western musical scale and the order was randomly 
determined, the sequences did not sound melodic.   
Procedure  
After completing eight supervised practice trials, each participant performed five randomly-
ordered blocks of experimental trials. In each 40-trial block, values were assigned to accuracy on 
the visual array and tone discriminations such that the total value of correct responses on any 
single trial equaled 1000 points. The allocation of points to each task was always explicit.  
Correct responses to each array were worth 1000, 750, 500, 250 or 0 points each in different 
blocks, with the reward for the tones set to 1000 minus the reward for the arrays. Pilot testing of 
this procedure indicated that participants were more motivated when each trial was worth a large 
number of points, vague with respect to the actual amount of money each response was worth, 
rather than a description of the small amount of real money each correct response was worth 
(rather like the reward structure for playing arcade games). Participants knew that they could 
earn money by making accurate responses, and were specifically instructed that points 
corresponded to money and that by accumulating as many points as they could, they would earn 
the most pay.   
 Participants viewed two visual arrays and were asked to judge whether the arrays were the 
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same or different. If the arrays differed, only the color of one square changed. Likewise, 
participants heard two tone sequences and were asked to judge whether the sequences were the 
same or different. If the sequences differed, they differed only in the frequency of one tone. Half 
of all of the test arrays and sequences differed from the sample stimuli. The visual and tone 
stimuli were independent; change in one type of stimulus did not increase or decrease the 
likelihood of change in the other stimulus. Participants were instructed to repeat the word “the” 
softly (2 repetitions/s) during each trial in order to suppress verbal rehearsal of the stimuli, and 
an experimenter monitored their suppression throughout the session. Articulatory suppression 
began when the fixation cross appeared, and continued at least until the first response prompt 
appeared; participants were not prevented from suppressing throughout the trial if they preferred, 
as many did. No participant included in the analysis needed to be reminded to suppress 
articulation more than once after the practice session ended.    
 The trial events presented in Figure 1 were similar for all subsequent experiments (which 
differed slightly in timing, assignment of orders to individuals, and levels of reward conditions). 
The critical segments of a trial included presentation of a sample stimulus in Task 1 (visual array 
or tone sequence), sample stimulus in Task 2, test stimulus and query display in Task 1 
(requiring a same-different response), and test stimulus and query display in Task 2 (requiring 
another same-different response). At the end of each trial, feedback was provided for both tasks.  
 Because a response occurred during either the array or tone inter-stimulus interval 
depending on the task order, it was not possible to perfectly equate the duration of each task, but 
it was possible to make them similar. For the visual array comparison task, the onsets of the 
sample and test arrays were separated by 2100 ms when the array task began first, and 2100 ms 
plus response time to the test tone sequence when the array task began second. For the tone 
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sequence comparison task, the onsets of the first tone in each sequence were separated by 3100 
ms when the tone task began first and 3700 ms plus response time to the test array when the tone 
task began second. (In Experiment 3, when task order was manipulated within-participants, these 
timings were made as similar as possible.)  
Experiment 2 
 This experiment differed from the first in the inclusion of control trials intended to test 
whether it could be the absolute, rather than relative, reward assigned to each task that mattered. 
Participants 
 Nine men and twenty-three women participated in Experiment 2, for partial course credit 
and up to $10, depending on performance. Monetary reward ranged from $7.11 to $9.41, with a 
mean reward of $8.27. The data of two participants were removed from the analysis due to 
chance performance on at least one task, leaving a final N=30.  
Apparatus and stimuli 
 All equipment used in Experiment 2 was the same as that used in Experiment 1. Visual array 
and tone sequence stimuli were constructed as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
 Experiment 2 included two conditions in which reward for correct completion of each task 
was equal instead of relative. In the low reward condition, participants earned 250 points for 
each correct response to either the visual-array or the tone-sequence task. In the high reward 
condition, participants earned 750 points for each correct response to either task. We also 
included four relative reward conditions, in which each task was worth 0, 250, 750, or 1000 
points, with the total possible reward on each trial equal to 1000 points. Each combination of 
reward levels was presented in randomly-ordered blocks of 40 trials each. All other aspects of 
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Experiment 2, including the between-subject order manipulation, and selection and duration of 
stimuli remained as they were in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 3 
 This experiment differed from the others in that the order of visual and auditory memoranda 
within a trial was varied within participants. 
Participants 
 After excluding 2 subjects for chance performance in at least one of the tasks, Experiment 3 
included 16 men and 8 women, a total N=24. Reward for a one-hour experimental session ranged 
from $6.54 to $9.21, with a mean of $7.88.   
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 Equipment and tasks used in Experiment 3 were the same as that used in Experiments 1 and 
2.   
Procedure 
 Participants completed one set of trials in which the sample array was presented first, 
followed by the sample tone sequence, test visual array, and test tone sequence and one set in 
which the sample tone sequence occurred first, followed by the sample visual array, test tone 
sequence, and test visual array. Order of these blocks was counterbalanced.   
 Within each block, relative reward conditions were presented in randomly-ordered blocks.  
The sum of potential rewards for each trial always equaled 1000 points, and each task could be 
worth 0, 500, or 1000 points, making three reward conditions in each task-order block, or six 
blocks total per experimental session. Participants first completed an unpaid practice session of 
eight trials. After the first three blocks of trials, participants were required to take a break lasting 
at least one minute. After this break, participants completed eight more unpaid practice trials 
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before continuing with the final three blocks of the session. Each experimental session included 
192 paid trials, amounting to 32 trials per reward condition block. 
 Regardless of task order, the interval between the offset of the first task’s stimuli and the 
appearance of the test stimuli for the first task was always 3250 milliseconds. This interval for 
the second task varied depending on participant’s response to the first stimulus but for each case 
measured 3250 milliseconds plus response time to the other task’s test stimulus.   
Results 
 Throughout this paper, inferential results will be reported in terms of capacity estimates 
rather than proportions correct.  These estimates allow a concrete understanding of how many 
visual items cost how many auditory items in performance as the attention allocation changes, as 
explained in the introduction.   
We calculated capacity estimates using Pashler’s (1988) formula, which is more appropriate 
for use with whole-report probe designs than that of Cowan (2001; also Cowan et al., 2005). If a 
change occurred, only one item changed, but no cue was given to limit the decision to one 
particular square in the test array or one tone in the test sequence. That is the situation motivating 
Pashler’s estimate. The relevant formula is  
k=S(h-f)/(1-f)                                                                         (1) 
where k is the number of items loaded into working memory; S is the set size in the modality 
tested; h is hits, the proportion of changes correctly detected; and f  is false alarms, the 
proportion of non-changing displays incorrectly judged to have changed. The formula is based 
on the assumption that a change in the stimuli can be detected on k/S of the trials in which there 
is a change and, if no change is detected, the participant nevertheless guesses “change” on some 
proportion g of the remaining trials. This proportion g is the same for change and no-change 
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trials and thus drops out of the final formula. In our studies, because the number of items in each 
display is larger than the set size at which k typically reaches asymptote (see Cowan, 2001), we 
take k to reflect the limit in capacity. Calculating capacity estimates allowed a direct comparison 
between tasks, even though more to-be-remembered items were presented in the visual task than 
the auditory task. 
Mean hit and correct rejection rates (from which false alarm rates were derived) for each 
task in each experiment can be found in Tables 1-3. These rates were used to calculate estimates 
of memory capacity, also given in these Tables. Because the reward manipulation produced 
similar results across experiments, conditions were combined across experiments in statistical 
analyses1.  
- - - - Tables 1-3 about here - - - - - 
Our analyses focus on two questions: first, are the effects of reward consistent with a 
flexible division of resources? To answer this question, we considered data from all three 
experiments combined. In the combined analysis, we included all reward conditions with a total 
reward of 1000 points divided between the modalities (0/1000, 250/750, etc). Because we were 
primarily interested in discovering whether any effect of reward was ordered with reward size, 
we used a Bayes factor approach (Jeffries, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995). Using Bayes factors, it 
is possible to directly test which orderings the data support. Following the Bayesian analysis, we 
used ANOVAs and post hoc comparisons to compare condition means. This analysis is likely to 
be more familiar to the typical reader and, as we will show, the results of these two analyses 
converge upon the same conclusion. 
Second, can these effects be attributed to the relative amount of reward assigned to each 
task, as is generally assumed, rather than the absolute amount of reward assigned to each task? 
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To test this, we considered the equal high and low reward conditions (250/250 and 750/750) 
from Experiment 2.   
Effects of Relative Reward Amount on Attention Allocation  
Bayesian analysis.  In order to address whether performance ordered with reward size, we fit 
a Bayesian hierarchical working memory model (R. Morey, accepted) based on Pashler’s (1988) 
assumptions to the data from both the auditory and visual task. Figure 2 (upper panel) shows the 
posterior mean capacities in the auditory task plotted against the posterior mean capacities in the 
visual task. The intervals are posterior standard deviations on the differences from the no reward 
condition for each task. In addition to estimates of the effects of reward, the model also provides 
estimates of the posterior probability of the true orderings of the reward effects. Because there is 
always uncertainty in sampling, the observed order of the reward conditions in our data may not 
be the true orderings. Our hypotheses regard true orderings of the conditions, considered jointly 
for the visual task and the auditory task. The posterior probability of each joint ordering may be 
used to construct tests of specific hypotheses regarding the allocation of resources. 
- - - - Figure 2 about here - - - - - 
We constructed hypotheses by considering 3 groups of joint orderings that might reasonably 
describe the deployment of attention resources. These nested cases are depicted in Figure 3. The 
most basic theoretically plausible case supposes that attention allocation is inflexible, such that 
attention might be deployed only in an all-or-none manner. Any ordering in which the 0-point 
reward corresponds with lower estimates of capacity than all of the rewarded conditions is 
consistent with this possibility, which is represented by A (Figure 3, white region). A stronger 
claim is that attention can be flexibly divided between two stimulus sets. In that case, the payoff 
conditions in which there is some reward allocated to each task should produce capacity levels 
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for a given task that are all higher than is found when there is no reward for that task, and lower 
than is found when there is reward exclusively for that task. Any ordering in which the 0-point 
reward corresponds with the lowest capacity estimate and the 1000-point reward corresponds 
with the highest estimate is consistent with this hypothesis, represented by B (Figure 3, dark grey 
region). Finally, we also considered C (Figure 3, black region), which included only the perfect 
joint ordering of capacity estimates with reward amount in both tasks. This joint ordering 
represents the strongest case for a flexible allocation of resources.  
- - - - Figure 3 about here - - - - - 
To construct our Bayes factor tests, we first considered all three hypotheses equally likely a 
priori; thus, each hypothesis has even odds against each other hypothesis. A Bayes factor 
analysis proceeds by determining the amount by which the data change the odds of each 
hypothesis relative to each other hypothesis. The Bayes factor for the broadly flexible allocation 
hypothesis (B exclusive of C) versus the inflexible allocation hypothesis (A exclusive of B and 
C) was 19, meaning that the data favored the flexible allocation hypothesis by 19 to 1, 
considered strong evidence against the inflexible allocation hypothesis (Jeffries, 1961). The 
inflexible allocation hypothesis was rejected even more decisively against the strong flexible 
allocation hypothesis (that is, C versus A); this Bayes factor was 53, which is considered very 
strong evidence. Finally, the data substantially favored the strong flexible allocation hypothesis 
over the weaker flexible allocation hypothesis (C versus B), by a factor of 6 to 1. Overall, the 
data provide substantial evidence in favor of the flexible resource allocation hypothesis. More 
details about these analyses and estimation procedures are given in the Appendix. 
Traditional analysis. Two ANOVAs were carried out on the conditions with a total of 1000 
points per trial, one on capacity estimates from Experiments 1 and 2 which included task 
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(auditory or visual) and reward for that task (0, 250, 750, or 1000 points) as within-participants 
factors and another with the same factors on capacity estimates from Experiments 1 and 3, with 
three levels of reward (0, 500, or 1000 points). In both cases, significant main effects of task type 
and reward were found and, in the analysis of Experiments 1 and 3, a significant interaction 
between task and reward was observed. Table 4 gives the details of each of these tests. Effects of 
reward were always consistent with the assumption of a trade-off; as reward to one task 
increased, capacity for that task increased.  
- - - - Table 4 about here - - - - - 
Post-hoc Newman-Keuls comparisons from both ANOVAs suggested that trade-offs 
occurred and were to some extent flexible. For the visual task, one analysis showed that 
performance under all three allocations differed from one another (i.e., 0<500<1000 points; 0 
points: M=2.83, SEM=.27, 500 points: M=4.09, SEM=.22, 1000 points: M=4.85, SEM=.21) and 
the other analysis similarly showed that both extremes (0 points: M=2.75, SEM=.27, 1000 points: 
M=4.63, SEM=.22) differed from each other and from the two intermediate allocations (250 
points: M=3.98, SEM=.26, 750 points: M=4.08, SEM=.30), which did not differ, p=.69 (i.e., 
0<250=750<1000 points). These analyses provide evidence for at least three states of attention 
allocation: zero, divided, and full. For the auditory task, one analysis showed that a zero 
allocation produced poorer performance than a non-zero allocation (i.e., 0<500=1000 points; 0 
points: M=1.68, SEM=.23, 500 points: M=2.65, SEM=.12, 1000 points: M=2.44, SEM=.16) ; the 
other analysis showed that zero allocation (M=1.56, SEM=.23) produced poorer performance 
than 750 (M=2.57, SEM=.16) or 1000 allocation (M=2.63, SEM=.16), and also that a minor 
allocation of 250 points (M=2.03, SEM=.18) produced poorer performance than a larger 
allocation (i.e., 0=250<750=1000 points).  Thus, in the auditory task as in the visual, at least 
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three states of attention allocation exist, though with different cutoff points for the two 
modalities. Both the ANOVAs and the Bayes factor analyses indicate that the data are highly 
consistent with the assumption of a trade-off determined by relative reward levels for accuracy in 
each task, supporting at least some degree of flexibility in the allocation of a shared attention 
resource.  
It is worth noting that the ANOVAs are limited by the inability to include all conditions in a 
common analysis.  Both the Bayesian and the traditional analyses provide strong support for at 
least weak flexibility with three reward states (Figure 3, B) and the Bayesian approach 
considering all of the data together suggests that there may indeed be stronger, more finely 
graded flexibility (Figure 3, C). 
Even though a large trade-off is apparent between these conditions, it does not seem to be 
the case that participants ignored the 0-reward task entirely. Although performance on the 
unrewarded task was low, it was consistently above chance.  This, of course, could occur on the 
basis of memory that is automatically rather than effortfully encoded or if participants were 
motivated partially by factors other than the monetary reward.    
Effects of Absolute Reward  
 Are the relative reward assignments causing participants to allocate their attention to one 
task at the expense of the other, as dual-task logic assumes, or are participants simply trying 
harder in the higher-reward task because of the absolute amount of reward in that task?  Possibly, 
the amount of resources used is not constant, but is instead greater during blocks that include 
high-reward trials (e.g., 1000 points for either task) than during blocks with mediocre rewards 
for both tasks. This question can be examined by comparing conditions in which the reward for 
both tasks is the same, both low or both high.  If performance levels are higher with more overall 
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reward, it suggests that part of the reward effect in other conditions may not be due to the 
allocation of attention to one task versus the other after all, but rather to the absolute reward for 
each task.  To our knowledge, this control has never before been considered in an analysis of the 
effect of reward on attention allocation. In Experiment 2, two absolute reward control conditions 
were included to test whether participants allocate attention differently when both tasks are 
worth the same low (250 points) or high (750 points) amount. To answer this question, we again 
used a Bayesian approach (we report an ANOVA also). The hypothesis test of interest is whether 
there is evidence that the two equal reward conditions (250/250 and 750/750) yield different 
performance. To test this hypothesis, we took a nested models approach and compared the fit of 
a model in which an effect of reward level (250/250 or 750/750) is allowed, versus one in which 
this effect is constrained to be 0. For this comparison, it is most convenient to use the deviance 
information criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & van der Linde, 2002). Although the 
Bayes factors for the discrete hypotheses tested in answering our first question were 
straightforward to compute, Bayes factors for point-null hypotheses are difficult to compute for 
complex models. The DIC is an appropriate alternative for model testing. DIC is a penalized-
likelihood criterion similar to AIC (Akaike, 1974) and BIC (Schwartz, 1978); models with lower 
DIC values are preferred.  The model with no reward effects yielded a lower DIC (17949.3) than 
the model including reward effects (17953.5), which favors the null hypothesis that absolute 
reward value does not greatly affect capacity estimates.  
Likewise, a two-way ANOVA with task and absolute reward condition (low or high) as 
factors revealed only a main effect of task domain (F(1,29)=21.75, MSe=4.08, η2p=.43); absolute 
reward amount (F(1,29)=0.79, p=0.38, η2p=.03) and the task by reward interaction 
(F(1,29)=0.38, p=.54, η2p=.01) were both non-significant. Though another two-way ANOVA 
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including all of the reward conditions from Experiment 2 revealed a significant main effect of 
reward, post-hoc Newman-Keuls tests again uncovered no significant differences between the 
high and low absolute reward conditions, or between the high and low absolute reward 
conditions and the intermediate relative reward conditions in either task (ps .33-.87). These 
analyses both suggest that for both the visual array and tone sequence tasks, the value of the 
reward alone had no effect on capacity estimates. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that 
the differences observed in the relative reward conditions were due to resource trade-offs and not 
merely to increased motivation during blocks with higher reward values. 
  
General Discussion 
 Using payoffs to manipulate volitional attention allocation and a novel Bayesian ordering 
analysis for hypothesis testing, our research contributes to ongoing discussions of the nature of 
attention allocation to working memory tasks. First, we have verified two assumptions about 
volition that are commonly made with respect to working memory performance, but have not to 
our knowledge been directly measured: 1) that a trade-off between visual-spatial and auditory-
temporal memories occurs with manipulation of rewards as well as with manipulation of task 
difficulty, and 2) that the outcome of a payoff experiment is not only the result of changes in 
overall motivation between conditions. Our results were consistent with the assumption that 
some constant, limited resource is divided between the two tasks, and furthermore suggest that 
such a resource can be divided flexibly, not only shared in an all-or-none manner. This 
knowledge should lead to better specification of how the sharing of resources in working 
memory should be described. The vagueness with which these resources have been described in 
the past limits any researcher’s ability to clearly falsify hypotheses about resource-sharing in 
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working memory. We think that our findings, if applied to theories, will help to address this 
problem.  
The studies reported above largely replicate previous findings by Morey and Cowan (2004, 
2005) manipulating reward for task performance instead of task difficulty, but provide three 
important clarifications to their previous work. First, cross-domain interference cannot be 
attributed to any unknown, obligatory priority assignment to one task or stimulus type over the 
other; if this were the case, then we might not have observed an effect of reward consistent with 
the assumption of a trade-off. Second, the cross-domain interference Morey and Cowan 
documented was not due only to interference between verbal and visual-spatial stimuli, since the 
present studies show interference between tone and visual-spatial stimuli. Finally, our evidence 
is consistent with the proposition that a shared resource can be flexibly divided between two 
stimulus sets. This resource could be used to store information directly as Cowan (2001, 2005) 
and Oberauer (2002) suggest, possibly in the form of the episodic buffer of Baddeley (2001); or 
it could reflect the contribution of something like the central executive proposed by Baddeley 
(1986, 2007). Our data do not allow us to conclude that one of these constructs is superior to the 
others, but instead establish new limits and possibilities about what theorists may reasonably 
claim any shared resource does. 
 The psychological literature includes some impressive cases of successful multi-tasking, 
such as auditory shadowing while playing the piano or engaging in a visual memory task 
(Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972) and reading while taking dictation (Hirst, Spelke, Reaves, 
Caharack, & Neisser, 1980). Although we have observed a trade-off between two concurrent 
tasks, our results also suggest that shared resources can be divided, at least to some degree. 
These extreme cases of excellent multi-tasking might be explained as well by a flexibly-divisible 
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shared resource as by separate, independent resources (for a detailed analysis see Cowan, 1995).  
Note also that this impressive multi-tasking was not necessarily cross-modal or cross-domain, so 
positing separate resources for stimuli from different domains does not necessarily explain these 
instances sufficiently.  
 Rather than suppose that there are multiple attention resources distinguished by reliance on a 
particular sensory domain (Wickens, 2002), it is possible to suppose that some other difference 
between the two tasks enabled their simultaneous completion. In the study of Hirst et al., even 
though the tasks both involved verbal stimuli, it is plausible that dictation may rely more on an 
automatic phonological store while the semantic processing needed for reading comprehension 
relied primarily upon a central attention resource. This explanation would be consistent with the 
process-based view of interference described by Marsh, Hughes, and Jones (2009), who showed 
that meaningful irrelevant speech does not equally interfere with all verbal tasks, but instead 
selectively interferes with a categorization task more than with a serial recall task. Furthermore, 
in these cases participants were experts in at least one of the task’s domains (e.g., piano-playing, 
dictation-taking), which might have enabled them to perform that task somewhat automatically, 
with little reliance on a shared attention resource. All things considered, a shared attention 
resource that can be flexibly divided seems at least as plausible as separate attention resources, 
and is a more parsimonious proposition. 
 Even so, it seems unlikely that all resources in working memory are shared between visual-
spatial and auditory-verbal materials. We believe that the strongest versions of single, cross-
domain models are probably inadequate, as are the strongest versions of multiple, domain-
specific resource models. If memory were accomplished solely by a domain-general store, one 
might expect to observe a one-for-one, item-to-item trade-off between items from concurrent 
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stimulus sets, regardless of their domain. Here, we do not observe an item-to-item trade-off 
between visual-spatial and tone items, although there is clearly a cost for both tasks; the cost of 
one visual item was worth about 0.5 acoustic items. One possible explanation for this is that we 
did not include masks to eliminate lingering sensory memories; Saults and Cowan (2007) 
showed in a similar procedure that this was necessary to observe item-to-item trade-offs. 
Therefore in our studies, reliance on a shared resource might have been somewhat reduced 
compared with the studies of Saults and Cowan. Auditory-verbal stimuli benefit more from 
automatically-activated echoic memory more than visual stimuli benefit from iconic memory 
(Darwin, Turvey, & Crowder, 1972) and the results of Saults and Cowan appear to confirm this. 
This factor might generally force a greater reliance on a central resource in visual, but not the 
auditory, tasks. This proposition is consistent with our data, in that the variance in capacity 
estimates with reward amounts was greater for the visual than the auditory task, as might be 
expected if participants can rely more on auditory than visual sensory memories to make a 
decision. 
 Gopher and Donchin (1986) suggested three possible interpretations for data that fit neither 
a strong separate resources nor a strong central resource model: (1) that one or both tasks are at 
ceiling, or are data-limited in Norman and Bobrow’s (1975) terms; (2) there is a marginal 
divided attention cost, i.e., with less total usable resource in a divided-attention situation than in 
a full-attention situation; or (3) there is partial overlapping demand for a common resource. We 
argue that in this case, the third explanation is most plausible. Performance levels on both the 
visual array and the tone sequence tasks were safely below ceiling level. Although we cannot 
truly test whether a there was a cost for dividing attention (because we have no data from pure 
single-task conditions), performance in the 1000-point reward conditions was comparable to 
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single-task performance observed in other studies (Cowan, et al., 2005). Moreover, a divided-
attention cost alone cannot explain the existence of three states of attention allocation in both 
modalities. The reason for supposing a partial overlapping demand for a common resource is that 
the central store might be supplemented by sensory memory, phonological and visuo-spatial 
memory (Baddeley, 1986), and/or activated elements of long-term memory (Cowan, 1988).   
 Others have suggested that concurrent tasks may draw upon one attentional resource that can 
be rapidly switched between tasks (e.g., Alvarez, Horowitz, Arsenio, DiMase, & Wolfe, 2005). 
Our results cannot confirm or falsify an attention-switching account; it is a potential direction for 
future studies of cross-domain resource sharing in working memory, but a challenging one, 
inasmuch as it is difficult to distinguish empirically between resource switching and resource 
sharing when trade-offs are observed. Thus, it is possible that participants in our studies allocated 
attention on an all-or-none basis on each trial, and that our observation of flexible division 
actually reflects a different mixture of all-or-none states in each combination of reward 
conditions.  This unresolved question is analogous to the question of whether capacity limits 
themselves occur because of concurrent attention to the items (Cowan, 2001) or one-at-a-time 
processing of a limited number of items repeatedly on a rapid time scale (Lisman & Idiart, 1995).  
Just as capacity limits are of interest without resolution of this tough issue, it is theoretically 
important that we observe a flexible tradeoff between tasks, regardless of whether that tradeoff 
occurs within individual trials or only in the balance between trials. 
The relation between working memory storage and a more general attention resource used in 
other phases of processing in working memory also warrants further study. Fougnie and Marois 
(2009) found that when two visual working memory tasks are presented together, the encoding 
and responding processes are unaffected, except when the storage capacity limit interferes with 
 Reward-Induced Trade-offs in Working Memory      28 
further encoding; also, Woodman and Vogel (2005) showed that although consolidation of new 
items can occur while other items are being stored, the number of items that can be consolidated 
is limited by the amount of working memory capacity remaining. Both Fougnie and Marois and 
Woodman and Vogel ultimately argue that general attention processes, which are typically found 
to be involved in encoding and retrieval, are not used for visual working memory maintenance. 
Theoretically, one could extend that suggestion to the present study, but only if a working 
memory store that is shared between modalities is separate from attention. This suggestion is 
consistent with Baddeley’s division of the central executive, a processing resource, from the 
episodic buffer, a domain-general store. However, it is not currently known whether this possible 
dissociation of general attention processes from storage in visual working memory tasks also 
holds for situations in which both visual and auditory or verbal representations must be 
maintained. 
While our results are consistent with the division of a shared store or some shared attentional 
resource, we believe that at least, it might be possible to use attention to boost fragile memories, 
in order to prevent over-writing (Cowan & Morey, 2006) or to delay the complete loss of 
complex representations in short-term memory (or “sudden death” as Zhang and Luck (2009) 
call this particular forgetting phenomenon). This role for attention could theoretically occur as 
refreshing, thought to be a non-automatic executive function (Raye, Johnson, Mitchell, Greene, 
& Johnson, 2007). One difficulty with the suggestion that storage must be domain-specific and 
does not depend on attention is that it does not explain why the maintenance of items in a visual 
array is impaired by performance of a tone identification task that does not depend upon working 
memory storage (Stevanovski & Jolicoeur, 2007). One possibly reconciling speculation is that 
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storage in working memory does not necessarily depend on attention, but nonetheless benefits 
from the application of it. This topic is certainly one that requires further consideration. 
 The present studies extend and clarify previous observations of cross-domain interference 
(Morey & Cowan, 2004, 2005; Stevanovski & Jolicoeur, 2007). Previous research clearly 
suggested the necessity of including some shared resource, perhaps even a shared memory store 
(Cowan & Morey, 2007; Saults & Cowan, 2007) in models of working memory. Our findings 
limit the nature of that shared resource, suggesting that it can be flexibly allocated between two 
stimulus sets.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 We manipulated the order of the presentation of the tasks between participants in 
Experiments 1 and 2, and within-participants in Experiment 3, but have collapsed across 
it in all reported analyses. Although we always observed significant effects of task order 
on visual capacity estimates (such that visual capacity estimates were higher when the 
visual task was presented and tested first), auditory capacity estimates did not vary with 
order, and there were no significant interactions involving both order and reward 
variables (ps>.13), whether order was manipulated within- or between-participants. 
Because the order manipulation does not address either of our main questions, and 
apparently does not impact our inferences regarding task rewards, we have chosen not to 
include it in our report of the results. 
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Table 1 
 
Hit rates, correct rejection rates, and estimated capacity for the visual array and tone sequence 
tasks as a function of reward condition, Experiment 1. 
 
         Task Reward in Points per Trial      
Stimuli   Measure   0   250   500   750   1000  
 
Visual arrays 
   Hit rate   .56(.17)  .61(.20)  .59(.16)  .62(.20)  .67(.18)  
   CR rate   .69(.18)  .77(.12)  .83(.12)  .81(.13)  .84(.12) 
   Capacity  2.58(2.36) 3.92(1.96) 3.92(1.90) 3.98(2.40) 4.84(1.74) 
 
Tone sequences 
   Hit rate   .52(.20)  .50(.17)  .58(.16)  .56(.17)  .54(.15) 
   CR rate   .70(.20)  .75(.15)  .78(.13)  .78(.14)  .78(.13) 
   Capacity  1.59(2.08) 2.05(1.17) 2.82(1.00) 2.59(1.21) 2.37(1.28) 
Note. Mean capacity estimates for both tasks were computed with Pashler’s (1988) formula. 
N=32. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2 
 
Hit rates, correct rejection rates, and estimated capacity for the visual array and tone sequence 
tasks as a function of reward condition, Experiment 2. 
 
     
         Task Reward in Points per Trial      
Stimuli Measure    0   250   750   1000     
Relative Reward Conditions  
Visual arrays     
   Hit rate   .55(.19)  .63(.18)  .63(.20)  .61(.20) 
   CR rate   .73(.18)  .80(.15)  .82(.14)  .87(.08) 
   Capacity  2.93(1.94) 4.03(2.10) 4.19(2.37) 4.41(1.78) 
 
Tone sequences   
   Hit rate   .52(.16)  .52(.15)  .55(.19)  .62(.15) 
   CR rate   .68(.21)  .75(.15)  .78(.12)  .76(.13) 
   Capacity  1.52(1.41) 2.00(1.68) 2.54(1.40) 2.91(1.24)  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
       Low Reward (250)  High Reward (750)     
Absolute Reward Conditions 
 Visual arrays  
   Hit rate    .60(.15)    .63(.19) 
   CR rate    .80(.10)    .81(.09) 
   Capacity   3.93(1.56)   4.30(1.95)     
   
 Tone sequences    
   Hit rate    .56(.17)    .55(.20) 
   CR rate    .75(.12)    .76(.14) 
   Capacity   2.36(1.40)   2.44(1.51)  
                      
Note. In the absolute reward conditions, participants received the same number of points for 
correct responses on each task.  Mean capacity estimates were computed with Pashler’s formula 
(1988). N=30. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
 
Hit rates, correct rejection rates, and estimated capacity for the visual array and tone sequence 
tasks as a function of reward condition, Experiment 3. 
 
     
         Task Reward in Points per Trial      
Stimuli  Measure     0   500    1000     
Visual Arrays     
    Hit rate   .60(.13)   .66(.10)   .69(.14) 
    CR rate   .68(.17)   .75(.10)   .80(.08) 
    Capacity  3.15(1.40)  4.32(1.19)  4.87(1.33)  
   
Tone Sequences 
    Hit rate   .52(.13)   .57(.10)   .58(.12) 
    CR rate   .69(.13)   .73(.09)   .73(.10) 
    Capacity  1.81(1.07)  2.42(0.80)  2.53(1.05)    
Note. Mean capacity estimates were computed with Pashler’s (1988) formula for estimating 
capacity. N=24. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Task by Reward ANOVAs. 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 (Rewards: 0, 250, 750, 1000 points)         
       df   F   MSe  ηp2 
Task     1, 61  57.40*  5.98  .49   
 Reward     3, 183  22.75*  2.45  .27 
 Task x Reward   3, 183  2.04  2.43  .03 
 
Experiments 1 and 3 (Rewards: 0, 500, 1000 points)          
       df   F   MSe  ηp2 
Task     1, 55  87.37*   2.67  .61 
 Reward     2, 110  37.39*  1.90  .41 
 Task x Reward   2, 110  7.99 *  1.876  .13     
Note. Experiment 1 N=32, Experiment 2 N=30, Experiment 3 N=24.  
* p<.05 
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Figure Captions 
 
 Figure 1.  A graphic depiction of the basic procedure for the visual-array-first presentation 
order in all experiments. An alternative order in which the tone sequence was presented before 
the visual array at both study and test was also used. The correct visual response in this case is 
“different”. Feedback was given for both tasks after response to the second task was registered.   
Figure 2. Across experiments, visual array capacity estimates by tone sequence capacity 
estimates. Visual arrays included eight items and tone sequences included six items. Each data 
point represents concurrent reward conditions. Capacity estimates in the upper panel were 
calculated using hierarchical Bayesian techniques, with error bars representing posterior standard 
deviations on the differences from the no reward condition. In the lower panel, capacity 
estimates were calculated with Pashler’s formula, collapsing across participants, with error bars 
representing standard errors of the mean. For the relative reward conditions (circles), shades 
correspond to reward level with the lightest representing the highest auditory reward and the 
darkest the highest visual reward. The absolute reward conditions from Experiment 2 are 
represented by the light, upward-pointing triangle (low reward) and the dark, downward-pointing 
triangle (high reward) in the lower panel.   
Figure 3. Nested groups of orderings designated for Bayes factor analysis. The group A 
included joint orderings in which capacity in the 0-point reward condition was lower than for any 
other reward amount. B included joint orderings in which the 0-point reward resulted in the 
lowest estimates and the 1000-point reward resulted in the highest estimates, and C included 
only the perfect joint ordering, in which capacity estimates always corresponded to reward value. 
Hypothesis tests were always between these groups, exclusive of each other. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
